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How Will Persistent Low Expected Returns  
Shape Household Economic Behavior? 
 
Despite the recent rise of inflation in the United States and other Western developed 
countries, it appears that persistently low real interest rates are likely to characterize the global 
economy for some time to come. For instance, governments in many European nations can now 
borrow at negative real rates for as far out as 50 years (Lewin, 2016; Zeng, 2017). The present 
paper asks how a long-term low return environment will alter household economic behaviors 
including work and saving patterns, social security benefit claiming ages, and retirement 
decumulation.  
Our analysis is informed by previous research examining how rational decision makers 
are influenced by shocks or unanticipated surprises in the environments they confront. For 
instance, the influential work of Gomes and Michaelides (2005) and Cocco, Gomes, and 
Maenhout (2015) was extended by Love (2010) and Hubener, Maurer, and Mitchell (2016), 
who showed how marriage, divorce, and widowhood as well as the arrival of children can 
influence optimal consumption, insurance, asset allocation, and retirement patterns. Love 
(2007) and Gomes, Michaelides, and Polkovnichenko (2009) developed a lifecycle model 
which includes tax-deferred 401(k) retirement accounts. Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and 
Rogalla (2015) reported how capital market surprises alter saving and investment choices. Chai, 
Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell (2011) and Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008) explained how 
labor market adjustments and endogenous claiming of social security benefits can help workers 
manage earnings and capital market risk in a life cycle setting. Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell 
(2018) illustrated how the overall population would change behavior in response to low 
expected returns. 
In what follows, we build and calibrate a life cycle model incorporating population 
heterogeneity that embeds stock market and labor market uncertainty, stochastic mortality, U.S. 
tax rules and minimum distribution requirements for 401(k) plans, and real-world social 
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security benefit formulas. This calibrated lifecycle dynamic model produces realistic baseline 
results that agree with observed saving, work, and claiming age patterns of U.S. households. 
Next, we simulate anticipated changes in behavior given low real expected returns and compare 
outcomes with the baseline results. Our particular interest is to show how persistently low 
returns will alter behavior across a heterogeneous population. For instance, both men and 
women worker longer and claim social security benefits about a year later, and the response is 
most pronounced for the college-educated. Additionally, better-educated persons are more 
sensitive to real returns than other people, so they reduce saving in their tax-qualified retirement 
accounts the most. Accordingly, wealth inequality will be attenuated in a low expected return 
world. We also explore how results vary given a “Japanese” style economy with low expected 
returns and low equity risk premia, and we separately examine how results differ if an age-
based investment glide path similar to Target Date funds were to be imposed. Our findings are 
robust to these alternative formulations. 
 
The Lifecycle Model  
To illustrate how persistent low returns are likely to influence household behavior in a 
life cycle setting, we build and calibrate a rational dynamic consumption and portfolio choice 
model for utility-maximizing individuals over the life cycle. Using this, we simulate optimal 
outcomes in a positive real return environment, which we term the “baseline” setting. Finally, 
we compare those outcomes with results in a zero return world. 
Preferences. Working in discrete time, we posit that the individual’s decision period starts at 
𝑡𝑡 =  1  (age of 25) and ends at 𝑇𝑇 = 76 (age 100); accordingly, each period corresponds to one 
year. People have uncertain lifetimes, where the probability of surviving from year 𝑡𝑡 to 𝑡𝑡 +  1  
is denoted by 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡. We represent preferences in each period by the Cobb Douglas utility function 
𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡, 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡) =  (𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼)1−𝜌𝜌1−𝜌𝜌  which is a function of current consumption 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 and leisure time 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 (where 
the latter is normalized as a fraction of total available time). The parameter 𝛼𝛼 measures leisure 
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preferences, 𝜌𝜌 denotes relative risk aversion, and 𝛽𝛽 is the individual’s time preference factor. 
The value function is derived recursively as:  
 
𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡 = (𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼)1−𝜌𝜌1 − 𝜌𝜌 + 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡+1 ) ,    (1) 
with terminal utility 
 
𝐽𝐽𝑇𝑇 = �𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝛼𝛼�1−𝜌𝜌1−𝜌𝜌  and 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 = 1 after retirement. Survival rates 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 in the value 
function are taken from US Population Life Tables (Arias 2010). As discussed later, we 
calibrate the preference parameters in such a way that our results match empirical claiming rates 
reported by the U.S. Social Security Administration (2015) as well as actual wealth profiles 
invested in retirement plans.  
Labor Income, Work Patterns, and Social Security Retirement Benefits. Our model quite 
realistically allows individuals to select flexible work effort patterns and a retirement age: 
specifically, a worker can allocate up to (1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡) = 0.6 of his available time budget to paid work 
(assuming 100 waking hours per week and 52 weeks per year). Depending on his work effort, 
his uncertain yearly pre-tax labor income is:  
 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡) · 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 · 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1 · 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+1.    (2) 
Here 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 is a deterministic wage rate component that depends on age, education, and sex, and 
whether the individual works overtime, full-time, or part-time. The variable 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 · 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡+1 
represents the permanent component of the wage rate with independent log-normally 
distributed shocks 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡~𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁(−0.5σP2 , σ𝑃𝑃2) having a mean of one and volatility of σ𝑃𝑃2 . In addition, 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡~𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁(−0.5σU2 , σ𝑈𝑈2 )  is a transitory shock assumed to be uncorrelated with 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 and with 
volatility σ𝑈𝑈2 . This wage rate calibration follows Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell (2016) who 
estimated the deterministic component of the wage rate process 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 and the variances of the 
permanent and transitory wage shocks 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 and 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 using the 1975–2013 waves of the PSID.1 
                                                 
1 Dollar values are given in 2013 terms. 
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These are estimated separately by sex and educational level, where the latter is identified as less 
than High School, High School graduate, or at least some college (<HS, HS, Coll+).2 
In the U.S., a worker may decide to quit working and claim social security benefits 
between the ages of 62 and 70, where the benefit paid depends on his average lifetime 35 best 
years of earnings. If the individual claims benefits prior to (after) the system-defined Normal 
Retirement Age, his lifelong social security benefits are reduced (increased) according to a pre-
specified set of factors. If he works beyond age 62, the model requires that he devote at least 
one hour per week; also, overtime work is excluded (i.e., 0.01 ≤ (1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡) ≤ 0.4). 
Constraints During the Work Life. During his work life, an individual may use his cash on 
hand for consumption or for investments. Some portion 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡   of the worker’s pre-tax salary 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡   
can be invested in a tax-qualified 401(k)-retirement plan (up to a limit of $18,000, and from 
age 50 onwards, an additional $6,000 catch up contributions is allowed).3 Specifically, the plan 
is of the of the deferred taxation type such that contributions to the account and investment 
earnings are tax-exempt, while withdrawals are taxed. In addition, the worker may invest 
outside his retirement plan in risky stocks 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 and riskless bonds 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡. As such, his cash on hand 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 in each year is given by:  
 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 + 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡,    (3) 
where the usual constraints apply (i.e., 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡,𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0). One year later, his cash on hand is 
given by the value of stocks (bonds) having earned an uncertain (riskless) gross return of 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+1 
(𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓), plus income from work (after housing expenses ℎ𝑡𝑡), plus withdrawals  (𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡) from the 
401(k) plan, minus any federal/state/city taxes and social security contributions (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1): 
 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 + 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1(1 − ℎ𝑡𝑡) + 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 − 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 .    (4) 
                                                 
2 Details are given in Horneff, Maurer and Mitchell (2016); see Table A1, Appendix A.  
3 This approach to retirement benefit taxation is therefore similar to how conventional defined benefit and defined 
contribution plan payments are handled under U.S. tax law as per regulations from 2015 onward. 
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During his work life, the individual pays taxes (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1) which reduce his cash on hand 
available for consumption and investments Our model builds these in using a realistic payroll 
tax rate of 11.65% (1.45% for Medicare, 4% city and state taxes, and 6.2% for social security 
taxes). Additionally, under the US tax system, individuals must also pay progressive taxes on 
labor income and on withdrawals from tax-qualified retirement plans (including a 10% penalty 
tax for withdrawals before age 60), and on returns on stocks and bonds held outside tax-
qualified retirement accounts.4 If an individual’s cash on hand falls below 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡+1 ≤ $5,879 p.a. 
(an amount also exempt from income taxes), we posit that he will receive subsistence support 
from the government at a minimum level of $5,879 for the next year. 
Prior to the endogenous retirement age 𝑡𝑡 = 𝐾𝐾, assets in the worker’s tax-qualified 
retirement plan are invested in bonds earning a risk-free gross (pre-tax) return of 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓, and risky 
stocks paying an uncertain gross return of 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡. Each year, the individual decides on the relative 
exposure of his retirement assets in stocks 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 and (1 − 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠) in bonds. The total value (𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1401(𝑘𝑘)) 
of his 401(k) assets at time 𝑡𝑡 + 1 is determined by the previous period’s value minus 
withdrawals (𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡
401(𝑘𝑘)), plus additional employee contributions (𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡), plus matching 
contributions (if any) from the employer (𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡) , and nontaxed returns from stocks and bonds:  
 
𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1
401(𝑘𝑘) = 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠�𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡401(𝑘𝑘) − Wt +  𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡�Rt+1+ (1 − 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠)�𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡401(𝑘𝑘) − Wt +  𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡�𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 ,   𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  𝑡𝑡 <  𝐾𝐾.   (5) 
Subject to complex matching limits imposed by the Internal Revenue Code, employer matches 
are often feasible in the retirement accounts. Here we assume that the employer matches 100% 
of employee contributions up to 5% of the employee’s yearly salary (but, as per US law, not 
                                                 
4 For details, see Horneff, Maurer and Mitchell (2016). 
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exceeding $265,000 or $ 13,250 per year).5 Accordingly, the employer matching contribution 
is given by: 
 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = min�𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡, min(0.05𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡, 13,250)�.    (6) 
Wealth Dynamics after Claiming. As per U.S. social security rules, the worker may claim 
social security benefits between age 62 and 70. The social security benefit formula uses the 35 
best years of income converted into an annual Primary Insurance Amount (or the unreduced 
social security benefit) using a redistributive formula.6  Also by law, a retiree’s Required 
Minimum Distribution (RMD) amounts from his tax-qualified 401(k) account are set in 
accordance with the IRS Uniform Lifetime Table measures (IRS 2012a, b). Federal income 
taxes are calculated based on the individual’s taxable income, the six (progressive) income tax 
brackets and the corresponding marginal tax rates for each tax bracket (Horneff et al. 2015).   
After retirement at the endogenous age 𝐾𝐾, the individual has the opportunity to save 
outside the tax-qualified retirement plan in stocks and bonds: 
 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡.      (7) 
We model housing costs ℎ𝑡𝑡 as in Love (2010). Accordingly, cash on hand for the next period 
evolves as follows: 
 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 + 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1(1 − ℎ𝑡𝑡) + 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 − 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1.    (8) 
Social security old age retirement benefits are determined by the individual’s Primary Insurance 
Amount (PIA), which is determined by his 35 best years of earnings and his claiming age.7 
Social security payments (𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1 ) in retirement (𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝐾𝐾) are given by:  
                                                           𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾 ⋅ 𝜆𝜆𝐾𝐾 ⋅  𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡+1  .               (9) 
                                                 
5 Love (2007) reported that US pension contribution matching rates range between 1% and 10% with a modal 
value of 6%.   
6 For more on the Social Security formula see https://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/piaformula.html.   
7  The benefit formula is a piece-wise linear function of the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings providing (as of 
2013) a replacement rate of 90% up to a first bend point ($791), 32% between the first and the second bend point 
$4768), and 15% above that. See US SSA (nd). 
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Here 𝜆𝜆𝐾𝐾 is the adjustment factor for claiming prior to or after the government-set Normal 
Retirement Age, which in this exercise is set at age 66.8 The variable 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡  is a transitory shock 
𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡
  ~LN(−0.5𝜎𝜎ℇ2,𝜎𝜎ℇ2) reflecting out-of-pocket medical and other expenditure shocks during 
retirement (as in Love 2010). Benefit payments from social security are partially subject to tax 
at the individual’s federal income tax rate, as well as a 1.45% Medicare and 4% city and state 
tax.9  
We model the retiree’s 401(k) plan payouts as follows: 
 
𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1
401(𝑘𝑘) = 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠�𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡401(𝑘𝑘) − Wt�Rt+1+ (1 −𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠)�𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡401(𝑘𝑘) − Wt�𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 ,       𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  𝑡𝑡 <  𝐾𝐾.   (10) 
Under US law, plan participants must take retirement account payouts from age 70 onwards 
according to the Required Minimum Distribution (RMD) rules (m) specified by the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS 2012b). Accordingly, to avoid substantial penalty taxes withdrawals 
from the retirement account, the retiree must take into account the following constraint: 
𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡
401(𝑘𝑘)𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 <  𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡401(𝑘𝑘). All of these rich institutional factors are taken into account in 
generating our model outcomes. 
 
Optimal Behavior Under the Baseline 
We first simulate our model under what had been considered to be “normal” interest 
rate conditions, to illustrate baseline optimal patterns of consumption, saving, work, social 
security claiming, portfolio allocations outside inside and outside the tax-qualified accounts, 
and withdrawals from the tax-qualified 401(k) plans. This baseline calibration assumes a risk-
                                                 
8 The factors we use are 0.75 (claiming age 62), 0.8 (claiming age 63), 0.867 (claiming age 64), 0.933 (claiming 
age 65), 1.00 (claiming age 66), 1.08 (claiming age 67), 1.16 (claiming age 68), 1.24 (claiming age 69), and 1.32 
(claiming age 70). See US SSA (nd,). The Normal Retirement Age will move to age 67 in the near future. 
9 For tax rules for Social Security, see US SSA (nd). Based on the combined income up to 85% of Social Security 
can be taxed for households with high income additional to Social Security benefits. Yet because of quite generous 
exemptions, many households receive their Social Security benefits tax-free (see Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell 
2016). 
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free interest rate of 1%, and an expected risk premium on stocks (over the risk-free rate) of 5% 
with a volatility of 18%. When simulating other return environments, we vary these 
assumptions and then assess how behavioral outcomes compare. 
We posit that households maximize the value function (1) under the budget restrictions 
given above. Since this optimization problem cannot be solved analytically, we apply a 
numerical procedure using dynamic stochastic programming. To generate optimal policy 
functions, in each period 𝑡𝑡 we discretize the space in four dimensions 
30(X)×20(𝐹𝐹401(𝑘𝑘))×10(P)×9(K), with 𝑋𝑋 being cash on hand, 𝐹𝐹401(𝑘𝑘) assets held in the 401(k) 
retirement plan, 𝑃𝑃 permanent income, and K the claiming age. Next, we simulate 100,000 
independent life cycles based on optimal feedback controls for each of the six population 
subgroups of interest (male/female in three education groups of <HS/HS/Coll+). Using weights 
from the National Center on Education Statistics (2012) we aggregate the subgroups to obtain 
national mean values. The population is comprised of 50.7% females (of whom 62% have 
Coll+, 30% have HS, and 8% have <HS education), and 49.3% males (of whom 60% have 
Coll+, 30% have HS, and 10% <HS education).  
Baseline Results. For each of the six subgroups of interest, we select a unique set of values of 
the preference parameters so the model produces national 401(k) wealth profiles and social 
security claiming patterns compatible with historical evidence. After solving the model several 
times, we find that a coefficient of relative risk aversion ρ of 5, a time discount rate β of 0.96 
and a leisure preference parameter of 𝛼𝛼 = 0.9 are the parameters that closely match simulated 
model outcomes to empirical evidence.10  
This is evident from Panel A of Figure 1 which indicates that the social security claiming 
patterns generated by our baseline model align well with empirical claiming rates reported by 
                                                 
10 Interestingly, these parameters are also in line with those used in prior work on life-cycle portfolio choice; see, 
for instance, Brown (2001).   
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the US Social Security Administration (2015).11 In particular, the model produces a substantial 
peak at the earliest claiming age of 62, mirroring the data where around 45% of workers claim 
benefits at that early age. Also in line with the evidence, a smaller second peak can be seen at 
the (system-defined) Full Retirement Age of 66, where about 15% of workers claim benefits 
for the first time. 
Figure 1 here  
In addition, our model closely tracks EBRI (2017) data on average 401(k) account 
balances (in year 2015) for 7.5 million plan participants in five age groups (20-29, 30-39, 40-
49, 50-59, and 60-69). Panel B of Figure 1 compares our simulated and the empirical data for 
the five age groups, and it reveals that our simulated outcomes are remarkably close to the 
empirically-observed 401(k) account values.   
Overall, then, our model generates results that agree closely with observed saving and 
social security claiming behavior of U.S. households during what we call the “baseline” 
economic environment, before the advent of persistent low expected returns. 
 
How Persistent Low Returns Will Drive Behavioral Change 
 To determine how optimal economic behavior would differ in alternative interest rate 
environments, we compare outcomes for real risk-free interest rates of 0% and 2%, with a 
particular focus on the lowest and the highest expected return: in this case, the equity risk 
premium remains at 5% as in the baseline scenario. In addition, we analyze a situation a real 
risk-free 0% interest rate and an equity risk premium of only 2%. The latter scenario is 
comparable to the capital market situation characterizing Japan over the past 30 years. Table 1 
shows how social security claiming patterns would respond by gender and age, average 
claiming ages, and average hours of work. 
                                                 
11 This model therefore provides a theoretical backing for the empirical claiming patterns shown by Shoven and 
Slavov (2012, 2014). 
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Table 1 here 
 A first finding is that optimal social security claiming ages and hours of work increase 
when the risk-free rate is lower. This is not surprising, inasmuch as individuals earn less on 
their savings in a 0% environment and hence would need to withdraw more of their assets if 
they claimed early. Specifically, when the long term interest rate is 0% instead of 2%, average 
claiming ages rise by about one year later and average work hours are five percent higher, for 
both men and women. Moreover, substantially fewer women and men claim at age 62 in the 
low-return world: only 35.5% (24.2) of the females (males) do so when the real return is 0%, 
versus 46.1% (37.2%) at a 2% real return. This supports Shoven and Slavov’s (2012) and Cahill, 
Giandrea, and Quinn’s (2015) surmise that delayed claiming is more appealing in a low versus 
a high return environment. In the capital market scenario with a real interest rate of 0% and an 
equity premium of only 2%, behavior changes even more in the same direction. Men and 
women claim 1.5 years later on average, compared to the high return case. In addition, during 
the work life, individuals devote per week more than 3 hours more on the job, compared to the 
high return case.  
Figure 2 provides additional insight into the heterogeneous impact of low versus high 
returns. Specifically, the most-educated defer claiming more when returns are 0% versus 2%; 
a similar conclusion applies to both men and women. By contrast, the least-educated 
(particularly women) change claiming behavior very little.  
Figure 2 here 
Next, we report how optimal wealth accumulation patterns vary with the interest rate 
regime, both inside and outside 401(k) plans. Table 2 shows that workers build up far less 
wealth in their retirement plans in a low versus a higher expected return environment. For 
instance, if the safe yield is only 0%, middle-aged women (age 45-54) optimally accumulate an 
average of about $145,000 in their 401(k) plans. By contrast, in the 2% yield scenario, they 
average 20% more, or $168,400 at the same point in their life cycle. Middle-aged men 
11 
 
accumulate $176,100 in the zero-rate environment, and 20% more ($206,700) in the 2% interest 
rate scenario. In other words, the gain from saving in pretax plans is lower in a low return 
environment, depressing the tax advantage of saving in 401(k) plans. The Table also shows that 
the impact of a lower interest rate on assets in non-qualified accounts is relatively small. The 
reason is that such accounts tend to be held for precautionary reasons, to smooth consumption 
in case of income shocks or capital market shocks.  
Table 2 here 
In the worst-case “Japanese” capital market scenario, middle-aged (age 45-54) men as 
well as women accumulate 40% less in their tax-qualified retirement accounts compared to the 
more favorable baseline situation where the interest rate was 2% and the equity risk premium 
5%. The “Japanese” economic environment has a larger percentage impact boosting assets held 
outside retirement accounts, by 53% for middle-aged women and 39% for similar-aged men. 
Nevertheless, these nonpension accounts remain small compared to the 401(k) asset holdings. 
Figure 3 shows how 401(k) asset values diverge by gender and education under the low- 
versus the high-expected return scenarios. When returns are low, the optimal value of tax-
qualified retirement savings proves to be substantially smaller for both men and women, and 
for all three age and education groups. Additionally, saving reductions are most notable for the 
best-educated individuals. Conversely, in a higher return world, the college-educated save 30-
40% more, with 15% less for high-school dropouts. Accordingly, wealth inequality is 
diminished in times of low real expected returns.  
Figure 3 here 
Thus far, our analysis has assumed that households optimize their asset allocation inside 
their 401(k) plans (i.e. the portfolio weights in stocks and bonds are endogenous). Yet a large 
majority of 401(k) retirement plans today automatically default workers’ contributions into 
target-date investment strategies that follow an age-based allocation rule, entailing higher 
equity shares early in life and lower ones nearing and into retirement (Vanguard 2017). 
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Moreover, the regulatory environment has encouraged this practice, in that the 2006 Pension 
Protection Act permitted plan sponsors to include Target Date Funds (TDFs) as qualified 
default investment alternatives in participant-directed plans. Accordingly, we investigate how 
sensitive our results are to a default 401(k) allocation that follows an age-related portfolio rule; 
while there are many variants in the market, generally speaking the percentage of 401(k) assets 
invested in equities follows a (120 – age)/100 rule. This we implement in Table 3.12  
Table 3 here  
To illustrate the key differences in outcomes when the real interest rates drops from 2% 
to 0%, we report average differences in social security claiming ages (in years) and average 
percentage differences in 401(k) assets for the two investment strategies. Both females and 
males claim slightly later if the 401(k) plan were to be invested according to a Target Date (age-
based) rule versus optimal endogenous equity weights. This is accompanied by a larger drop in 
401(k) assets for the Target Date portfolio, compared to the endogenous asset allocation case. 
This is due to the fact that the worker’s exposure to bonds is higher under the Target Date 
approach versus the optimal asset allocation, particularly for older workers and for retirees.  
Nevertheless, as these differences are small in magnitude, we conclude the two investment 
approaches do not materially change economic behaviors in the context of persistently low 
interest rates. 
 
Conclusions  
Over $8 trillion of bonds currently trade at negative rates around the world, compared 
to none in 2014 (Slok, 2018). Despite this new global reality, relatively little research has 
focused on the profound impacts of persistent low returns on life cycle work, saving, 
investment, and social security claiming behavior.  
                                                 
12 We thank David Richardson for this suggestion. 
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Our contribution in this paper is therefore to develop and calibrate a richly-detailed life 
cycle model that enables us to explore the potential impacts of this new economic environment 
across heterogeneous population subgroups. To this end, we model realistic tax, social security, 
and minimum distribution rules, as well as uncertain income, stock returns, medical spending, 
and mortality. We then use this model to assess how key outcomes change. The baseline 
simulation which assumes a 1% expected real return generates wealth and claiming patterns 
quite consistent with the evidence, including a peak claiming rate at the earliest feasible age of 
62, and asset accumulation patterns comparable to actual data.  
By contrast, a zero expected return induces workers to claim social security benefits 
later and increase work effort. Moreover, people save less, particularly in their tax-qualified 
accounts, and they draw down their 401(k) assets sooner. Results prove to be similar for men 
and women, yet the best-educated subgroup optimally changes behavior more, compared to the 
least-educated.  Overall, the changes reduce observed wealth inequality. Sensitivity analyses 
allowing for age-based investment profiles akin to Target Date funds shows that results are 
robust. We also compare our results to those generated by a “Japanese” style economy with low 
expected returns and low equity premia, and again findings are comparable. 
We leave for future work a discussion of the potential macroeconomic consequences of 
reduced saving and earlier claiming patterns. Nevertheless, our life cycle model which 
embodies richly detailed tax and social security claiming rules is clearly an invaluable tool to 
help assess how households will react to the “new normal” financial market conditions.  
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Figure 1: Social Security Claiming Patterns and 401(k) Account Values in a “Normal” 
Return Environment: Model versus Data  
 
        A . Social Security Claiming Rates by Age           
  
 
      B. Average 401(k) Account Values by Age 
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Notes: Panel A compares endogenous social security claiming rates at ages 62-70 generated by our life cycle model versus 
retirement (and disability) empirical claiming rates by age from Social Security Administration (2015). Expected values 
are calculated from 100,000 simulated lifecycles based on optimal feedback controls for each of the six subgroups of 
interest. Results for the female (male) population use income by education levels for men (62% +Coll; 30% HS; 8% <HS) 
and women (60% +Coll; 30% HS; 10%<HS). Baseline calibration parameters are: risk aversion 𝜌𝜌 = 5; time preference 
𝛽𝛽 = 0.96; and leisure preference α=0.9. Social security benefits are based on average permanent incomes and the 2013 
value of bendpoints; minimum required withdrawals from 401(k) plans are based on life expectancy using the IRS-Uniform 
Lifetime Table in 2013; tax rules for 401(k) plans are as in Horneff (2015). The risk premium for stock returns is 5% and 
return volatility 18%; the risk-free rate in the Baseline is 1%. Panel B compares simulated 401(k) account balances by age 
(averages for ages 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60-69) with empirical data from EBRI (2017). Source: Authors’ 
calculations. 
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Figure 2: Average Increase in Social Security Claiming Ages (in Months) by Gender and 
Education for Expected Real Interest Rates of 0% instead of 2%  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes: This Figure reports the average claiming age difference for an interest rate level of 0% instead of 2%, by sex 
and three education groups (<HS, HS, +Coll), derived from 100,000 simulated lifecycles using optimal feedback 
controls in our life cycle model. The assumed risk premium for stock returns is 5% and return volatility 18%. Other 
parameters are in Figure 1. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Notes: This Figure reports the average difference in 401(k) assets (over the lifecycle) for an interest rate level of 0% 
instead of  2%, by sex and three education groups (<HS, HS, +Coll), derived from 100,000 simulated lifecycles using 
optimal feedback controls in our life cycle model. The assumed risk premium for stock returns is 5% and return 
volatility 18%. Other parameters are as in Figure 1. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Figure 3: Average Decline in 401(k) Assets by Gender and Education for Expected Real 
Interest Rates of 0% instead of 2% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
-40 -35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0
$(000)
fe
m
al
e 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  m
al
e
Coll+
HS
<HS
Coll+
HS
<HS
19 
 
 
Table 1: Optimal Social Security Claiming Ages and Work Hours by Gender for Different 
Capital Market Scenarios 
 Females  Males 
 Japanese  
Scenario 
0% 
Interest Rate 
2%  
Interest Rate 
 Japanese 
Scenario 
0%  
Interest Rate 
2%  
Interest Rate 
Panel A: Percent Claiming by Age 
Age 62  31.6   35.5   46.1   19.4  24.2   37.2  
Age 63  2.2   4.2   5.0   2.9  5.3   6.1  
Age 64  2.2   3.6   3.1   4.6  5.4   5.7  
Age 65  4.4   4.6   3.7   5.9  7.2   5.6  
Age 66  16.8   23.1   26.6   20.0  29.8   32.5  
Age 67  8.2   8.6   5.0   12.2  10.6   4.5  
Age 68  14.4   10.3   5.2   23.1  9.4   2.8  
Age 69  10.8   6.1   2.1   5.3  4.6   2.0  
Age 70  9.5   4.0   3.2   6.6  3.4   3.6  
        
Panel B: Average Claiming Ages 
 65.7 65.0 64.3  66.0 65.3 64.5 
        
Panel C: Average Weekly Hours of Work  
 35.2 33.4 32.0  41.8 39.8 38.2 
 
 
  
Notes: This Table reports claiming ages and weekly hours of work by age and gender, under three interest rate scenarios. 
Expected values are derived from 100,000 simulated lifecycles using optimal feedback controls in our life cycle model. 
The risk premium for stock returns is 5% and return volatility 18% in the 0% and 2% interest rate scenario. In the Japanese 
scenario, the interest rate is 0% and the risk premium for stocks is 2%. Other parameters are as in Figure 1. Source: 
Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 2:  Optimal Lifecycle Asset Accumulation Patterns by Gender for Different Capital 
Market Scenarios 
  Females   Males 
  
Japanese 
Scenario 
0%  
Interest Rate 
2%  
Interest Rate   
Japanese 
Scenario 
0%  
Interest Rate 
2%  
Interest Rate 
Panel A: 401(k) Assets ($000) 
 Age 25-34  19.4  25.0   28.5     19.1   24.4   27.5  
 Age 35-44  65.5  92.3   107.9     77.5   103.9   120.8  
 Age 45-54  93.2  145.0   168.4     119.1   176.1   206.7  
 Age 55-64  79.2  129.6   163.8     93.7   158.1   207.7  
 Age 65-74  39.8  94.4   140.2     37.1   105.8   167.1  
 Age 75-84  14.0  55.3   95.9     10.5   54.2   106.5  
 Age 85-94  1.7  17.7   39.4     1.0   14.7   39.5  
              
Panel B: Non-Qualified Assets ($000) 
 Age 25-34   3.7   3.7   3.9     5.0   5.1   5.0  
 Age 35-44   12.8   9.4   8.5     15.9   15.0   12.4  
 Age 45-54   20.7   12.3   13.6     25.0   20.5   18.0  
 Age 55-64  16.7   15.5   18.2     23.0   24.0   23.3  
 Age 65-74   13.1   12.6   12.5     20.0   18.3   17.8  
 Age 75-84   7.2   7.2   7.8     12.3   11.5   12.2  
 Age 85-94   5.8   6.0   6.1     8.4   8.4   8.3  
        
 
 
 
Table 3:  Impact of Endogenous versus Target Date Investments of 401(k) Assets on 
Claiming and Wealth Accumulation: Expected Real Interest Rates of 0% instead of 2% 
 
  Females   Males 
  
 
Claiming 
Age 
Change 
401(k) 
Asset  
Change   
Claiming 
Age 
Change 
401(k) 
Asset 
Change 
       
Target Date      +1.1  -18%       +1.0  -22% 
        
Endogenous       +0.8  -15%        +0.9  -20% 
            
 
Notes: This Table reports expected assets in tax-qualified 401(k) plans and non-qualified assets by age and 
gender, under three interest rate scenarios. Expected values are derived from 100,000 simulated lifecycles using 
optimal feedback controls in our life cycle model. The risk premium for stock returns is 5% and return volatility 
18%. In the “Japanese” scenario, the interest rate is 0% and the risk premium for stocks is 2%. Other parameters 
are as in Figure 1. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
Notes: This Table reports the average difference in 401(k) assets and average difference in Social Security 
claiming ages over the lifecycle for an interest rate level of 0% instead of 2% used in the base case. For the row 
labeled life Target Date, the equity weights of 401(k) assets are determined according to an age-based (120-
age)/100 rule. For the row labeled Endogenous, the equity weights in 401(k) assets are derived from optimal 
feedback controls in the life cycle model. The assumed risk premium for stock returns is 5% and return volatility 
18%. Other parameters are as in Figure 1. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
                
               
                   
                      
     
